Marx's Ethics of Freedom (Routledge Library Editions: Political Science Volume 49) by Brenkert George G

Author:Brenkert, George G [George G. Brenkert]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781135025762
Publisher: Taylor and Francis

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In conclusion, the preceding sections have developed the nature of Marx’s notion of freedom. This complex notion, which clearly stands in the tradition of Western philosophy, lies at the center of Marx’s ethics. That it has this central importance has been indicated by showing its relations to and connections with Marx’s practical demands, as well as by the manifold citations from Marx himself. In succeeding chapters I will seek to establish further this central role of freedom in Marx’s thought.

The aspects under which freedom has been characterized are clearly interrelated and connected. It is clear, however, that, for Marx, freedom is essentially self-determination. It is this basic characteristic which ties the various aspects of freedom together. That one objectify oneself in a concrete manner in his relations with other persons and with nature, as well as that one’s objectification be communal in nature, are limiting conditions on the kind of self-determination which characterizes freedom.

Marx’s ethics, as so characterized, is an ethics of virtue. It requires the development within individuals of certain character traits and dispositions. As such freedom is not only a moral but also an ontological notion. This does not mean that freedom is something innate in individuals. It must be prepared for, it must be taught, and it must be maintained by daily practice. It involves not simply thinking and feeling certain things, but acting in certain ways in certain situations.37 It is a way of being. One might say that it constitutes a unity of theory and practice! Given that one has acquired this way of living or being, we can understand Marx’s comments that under communism one can do as one pleases (e.g. MECW, 5:47). This is most clearly not the same as doing what one wants, which characterizes bourgeois freedom. One can also understand why Marx spends little time even attempting to detail how a person should decide this or that particular moral issue.

Inasmuch as freedom involves an ontological condition, a set of dispositions and traits, Marx does not have to fear the objection that he is simply imposing a moral principle, e.g. of self-realization, of Kantian duty, etc. on people. Rather, he claims to find in historical development (cf. Chapter 3) a development which leads to the creation in people of this very way of being. Thus his moral demands have a material or natural basis. Hence, his own ethical position does not conflict with his statement that:

the communists do not preach morality at all. … They do not put to people the moral demand: love one another, do not be egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are well aware that egoism, just as much as selflessness, is in definite circumstances, a necessary form of the self-assertion of individuals. (MECW, 5:247)

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